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View Full Version : Politics and Judicial Activism


Areopagus
17th August 2005, 07:20
http://www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2005/tst081505.htm

The nomination of Judge John Roberts to sit on the Supreme Court has reopened a bitter cultural divide in America, and the Senate confirmation hearings in September may exhibit more of the partisan rancor that characterized the Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas hearings.

It’s sad that so many Americans see their freedoms as dependent on a single Supreme Court justice. Federal judges were never meant to wield the tremendous power that they do in modern America. Our Founders would find it inconceivable that a handful of unelected, unaccountable federal judges can decide social policy for the entire nation.

Dozens of political pressure groups stood ready to launch an immediate public relations attack on any judge nominated by President Bush, while dozens of others stood ready to support the nominee no matter what. These groups reflect the unfortunate reality that millions of Americans unquestioningly support or oppose judicial nominees based solely on the party affiliation of the current president. Once again, blind loyalty to political parties has politicized a process that our Founders never intended to be political. When we as voters and citizens allow the nomination of judges to become political, we have only ourselves to blame for the politicization of our courts themselves. When courts become politicized, judges not surprisingly begin to act like politicians.

Judicial activism, after all, is the practice of judges ignoring the law and deciding cases based on their personal political views. With the federal judiciary focused more on legislating social policy than upholding the rule of law, Americans find themselves increasingly governed by men they did not elect and cannot remove from office.

Congress is guilty of enabling judicial activism. Just as Congress ceded far too much legislative authority to presidents throughout the 20th century, it similarly has allowed federal judges to operate wildly beyond their constitutional role. In fact, many current members of Congress apparently accept the false notion that federal court judgments are superior to congressional statutes. Unless and until Congress asserts itself by limiting federal court jurisdiction, judges will continue to act as de facto lawmakers.

The congressional power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction is plainly granted in Article III, and no constitutional amendments are required. On the contrary, any constitutional amendment addressing judicial activism would only grant legitimacy to the dangerous idea that social issues are federal matters. Giving more authority over social matters to any branch of the federal government is a mistake, because a centralized government is unlikely to reflect local sentiment for long. Both political parties are guilty of ignoring the 9th and 10th amendments, and federalizing whole areas of law that constitutionally should be left up to states. This abandonment of federalism and states’ rights paved the way for an activist federal judiciary.

The public also plays a role in the erosion of our judiciary. Since many citizens lack basic knowledge of our Constitution and federalist system, they are easily manipulated by media and academic elites who tell them that judges are the absolute and final arbiters of US law. But the Supreme Court is not supreme over the other branches of government; it is supreme only over lower federal courts. If Americans wish to be free of judicial tyranny, they must at least develop basic knowledge of the judicial role in our republican government. The present state of affairs is a direct result of our collective ignorance.

Areopagus
17th August 2005, 07:24
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju94458.000/hju94458_0.HTM#45
Notes on the Testimony Of Martin H. Redish, Louis And Harriet Ancel Professor Of Law And Public Policy, Northwestern Law School, June 24, 2004

Professor Redish is a nationally renowned authority on the subject of Federal jurisdiction. He received his A.B. With honors, with highest honors, in political science from the University of Pennsylvania and his J.D. Magna *** laude from Harvard law school. He has been described in a review of his book, The Federal Courts in the Political Order, as quote, ''without a doubt the foremost scholar on issues of Federal court jurisdiction in this generation,'' unquote.Professor Redish is the author or coauthor of 70 articles and 13 books, including Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Federal Power. He was recently included on a list of the 100 most cited legal scholars of all time.

Section 1.

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

There are absolutely no federal cases constitutionally excluded from state court jurisdictional authority. The State courts provide an adequate forum to interpret and enforce Federal law, including the Federal Constitution. State courts are empowered and obligated under article VI, clause 2, the supremacy clause, to interpret and enforce the Constitution. The Constitution didn't require Congress to create the lower federal courts (Madisonian Compromise). Congress did create the lower Federal courts immediately, but it is well established in the case law that that power to, from time to time, ordain and establish the lower Federal courts includes the power to abolish the lower Federal courts, and the greater power to abolish the lower Federal courts logically subsumes within it the power to leave the courts in existence, but limit their jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has proceeded on the logical assumption that if Congress possessed discretion not to create lower federal courts in the first place, it also has the power to abolish the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). Since it has been assumed that Congress possesses the authority to abolish the lower federal courts completely, the Court has assumed that it has the logically lesser power to ''abolish'' them as to only certain cases by limiting their jurisdiction.

Section 2.

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

In Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), the Supreme Court recognized the unlimited authority explicitly authorized in the text. There are no internal constitutional limits, no limits in article III on Congress' power. Its power is plenary. There are external constitutional limits on this power; the Due Process Clause, and the equal protection directive in the fifth amendment apply, but are satisfied by state courts which Congress can't affect. The text, and internal logic of the Constitution allows Congress to combine its power over the article III lower courts and the Supreme Court under the exceptions clause, the end result is that it can completely exclude Federal judicial power over pretty much any issue, as long as the State courts remain available. The case law agrees with the Constitution in this respect.

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The text and internal logic of the Constitution are the antidote for deceptive arguments claiming Congress hasn't the power which is explicitly stated, and which has been used with no objections of any U.S. Supreme Court. Congress' Article 3 power dosen't violate separation of powers, since the Constitution dosen't provide for Congress to adjucate a case, or dictatate a case, or enforce a decision, or overturn a decision. The states are bound by the Constitution, and not unconstitutional/extraconstitional federal judicial majority opinion.

The Avalon Project : Federalist No 81

"The judicial power of the United States is'' (by the plan of the convention) "to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.''1

The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this charge is founded, are to this effect: "The authority of the proposed Supreme Court of the United States, which is to be a separate and independent body, will be superior to that of the legislature. The power of construing the laws according to the SPIRIT of the Constitution, will enable that court to mould them into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions will not be in any manner subject to the revision or correction of the legislative body.... But the errors and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the United States will be uncontrollable and remediless.'' This, upon examination, will be found to be made up altogether of false reasoning upon misconceived fact.

In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration which DIRECTLY empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every State. I admit, however, that the Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws, and that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of the convention, but from the general theory of a limited Constitution; and as far as it is true, is equally applicable to most, if not to all the State governments. There can be no objection, therefore, on this account, to the federal judicature which will not lie against the local judicatures in general, and which will not serve to condemn every constitution that attempts to set bounds to legislative discretion.

To avoid all inconveniencies, it will be safest to declare generally, that the Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction both as to law and FACT, and that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such EXCEPTIONS and regulations as the national legislature may prescribe. This will enable the government to modify it in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security.

The Avalon Project : Federalist No 78 It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power 1 The celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them, says: "Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing.'' "Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws.'' vol. i., page 186. The Avalon Project : Federalist No 51 But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. Amendment IX - The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Amendment X - The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.